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In this essay I address several questions and challenges brought about by the contributors to the special 
issue on my book Democracy without Shortcuts. In particular, I address some implications of my critique of 
deep pluralism; distinguish between three senses of ‘blind deference’: political, reflective, and informational; 
draw a critical parallelism between the populist conception of representation as ‘embodiment’ and the 
conception of ‘citizen-representatives’ often ascribed to participants in deliberative minipublics; defend 
the democratic attractiveness of participatory uses over empowered uses of deliberative minipublics; 
clarify why accepting public reason constraints does not imply limiting deliberation to questions about 
constitutional rights; and argue that overcoming a state-centric conception of democracy does not 
require replacing the ‘all subjected’ principle with the ‘all affected’ principle.
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The combination of thought-provoking, critical, sharp, 
charitable, and fruitful comments that my critics have 
provided are the sort of comments that every author craves. 
These comments also show how much truth there is to the 
saying that interpreters understand a work much better 
than its author. I cannot discuss all the interesting issues, 
questions, and challenges raised by these comments. 
Properly responding to all of them would require multiple 
papers, even books. My hope is that these brief replies are 
the first step in an ongoing dialogue. Given that several 
commentators discuss some of the same central topics 
from different angles, I shall focus on each of these ‘big’ 
issues instead of trying to (within space constraints!) 
fully respond to each of the contributions. I shall address 
the topics in the order that they arise within the overall 
structure of the book.
I. Is Political Agreement Possible? Nailing Down 
the Critique of Deep Pluralism
In his comments, Jürgen Habermas correctly points 
out that my critique of deep pluralist conceptions of 
democracy is incomplete. In order to really ‘nail down’ 
such a critique I would need to show that normative 
statements are capable of being justified at all. As he 
very plausibly contends, ‘if moral statements, which 
constitute the controversial core of political questions, 
were not capable of being true at all, every deliberative 
exchange of reasons for and against normative statements 
in political debate would become pointless.’ (Habermas, 
this issue: 12) I agree. A full defense of the claim that 
political disagreements can be reasonably overcome 
requires a metaethical analysis that successfully uncovers 
the overarching standards that can be used to justify 
normative statements in general. I do not offer such an 
analysis in the book. Had I done so, I would have defended 
a non-reductive interpretation of discourse ethics that 
explains the internal relation between moral rightness 
and discursive agreement without equating the one to 
the other. As indicated in his comments, Habermas rejects 
this interpretation because he fears that it amounts to 
a form of moral realism that assimilates the meaning of 
assertoric validity claims to normative ones. In my view, 
these fears are unfounded. Over the last several decades, 
we have had an ongoing debate where I have tried to show 
that only the non-reductive interpretation of discourse 
ethics can avoid the anti-fallibilistic consequences of 
the constructivist interpretation that Habermas favors, 
according to which discursive agreement is not simply 
indicative but constitutive of moral rightness.1 Be that as 
it may, I did not include this (or any other) metaethical 
debate in the book for a particular reason. Doing so could 
have misled readers into thinking that my criticism of 
deep pluralism hinges upon a successful defense of a 
particular metaethical position. However, I believe that 
the deep pluralist approach collapses under the weight of 
its own internal difficulties.
Like any other conception, deep pluralists are trying to 
give a plausible account of democratic practices whose 
features exist independently of any of the competing 
accounts. In particular, deep pluralists essentially 
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rely on the existence of heated and ongoing political 
disagreements among citizens. They should therefore be 
able to give a plausible account of such a salient practice. 
My criticism tries to show that they simply cannot do 
this. Since background agreement is a condition of the 
possibility of meaningful disagreement, disagreement 
simply cannot go all the way down, as deep pluralists 
claim. Indeed, ongoing disagreements provide the best 
evidence for the existence of political agreement (which 
enables disagreements to be focused, have directionality, 
produce domino effects, and so forth). Deep pluralism is 
reflectively unstable precisely because it runs up against 
key preconditions of the practices it aims to explain. 
Citizens could not endorse it while simultaneously 
keeping such practices intact. Therefore, my criticism does 
not hold deep pluralism up to a deliberative ideal that it 
rejects. Instead, I scrutinize deep pluralism through the 
lens of a practice that they themselves attempt but (if my 
criticisms are plausible) fail to explain.
Habermas also questions the possibility of meaningfully 
separating the task of justifying claims in general from 
the task of justifying claims to others. This is an important 
issue that I should clarify in order to avoid any possible 
misunderstandings. If I understand his objection correctly, 
it is motivated by an important hermeneutic insight that 
I did not discuss in the book. Namely, we cannot adopt 
a third-personal attitude towards reasons. Reasons can 
only be identified as such from the internal perspective 
of someone who is evaluating their quality as persuasive 
or valid reasons. Thus, once I succeed at providing reasons 
that will persuade others it will be already too late for me to 
ask what I myself should believe. As Gadamer puts it, what 
is plausible ‘passes into one’s own thinking on the subject’ 
(Gadamer 1994: 375). If this is the case then figuring out 
what is correct or best and justifying it to others cannot be 
two separate processes; there is not one process whereby I 
convince myself of what is correct/best and then another, 
entirely separate process, whereby I try to persuade others 
with reasons that they can accept (even if I do not find 
those reasons convincing). I want to be clear that I am 
not trying to question the internal connection between 
understanding and evaluation. Indeed, in my opinion that 
connection holds not only within normative disputes but 
also amidst disagreements over facts. Moreover, although 
I do not explicitly discuss it in the book, I actually rely on 
this connection to defend the claim that deliberation can 
empower. Let me briefly indicate how the pieces of this 
argumentative undercurrent hang together.
In the book the point of differentiating between general 
justification and justification to specific others within a 
given political context is to highlight what goes wrong 
with epistocratic (and lottocratic) shortcut proposals. 
Defenders of these proposals take political justification 
to be a purely epistemic task. They are concerned with 
maximizing the chances of figuring out the ‘right’ or ‘best’ 
policies. If one adopts this purely epistemic perspective 
then it seems plausible to suppose that any improvement 
in the epistemic credentials of those who participate in 
deliberation and decision-making would help identify 
and enact better policies ‘faster’ and that this would also 
benefit ignorant non-participants. After all, in purely 
epistemic discourses it is the quality of the reasons that 
really matters rather than the identity of the participants 
that bring them to the fore. As such, why not delegate 
deliberating to those with the best epistemic credentials, 
as we do in scientific or legal discourses? Why do we have 
to justify the policies that we favor to our fellow citizens 
regardless of their epistemic qualifications? Or, to put 
the question in Habermasian terms, why do political 
debates have to include the views of all those affected? 
And why should decisional majorities take the views of 
disempowered minorities seriously if they do not find 
them plausible on their merits?
In contrast to purely epistemic discourses (scientific, 
moral, ethical, etc.), when we engage in political 
discourses we are not simply making up our minds about 
what the right views are. We are also talking about the 
imposition of coercion on others who have equal rights 
to be co-legislators. In scientific discourses it can be very 
helpful to disregard irrelevant or long-disproven views 
in order to figure out the right views ‘faster.’ However, 
in political discourses the situation is different. We not 
only have to figure out what the right policies are but 
we must also ensure that imposing these policies on 
others is legitimate. This means that those subjected 
to the policies in question have to be assured of their 
rightness so that they too could obey them of their own 
accord. This is why public deliberation must focus on 
the actual views, interests, and policy objectives of our 
fellow citizens, however wrongheaded they may seem to 
those who disagree with them. In politics, citizens do not 
get to choose their deliberative partners based on their 
epistemic credentials. For they owe justifications not 
simply to (whoever they consider) their epistemic peers 
but also to all those over whom they exercise coercion. 
The fact that some consideration matters to citizens—even 
if they are in the minority—means that this consideration 
must be assessed within public deliberation and properly 
addressed by counterarguments rather than simply 
ignored by the decisional majority.
My example of a conversation between a mother and 
her son tries to illustrate this idea. The point is not to focus 
on a case where one side got the facts right and the other 
got them wrong. Rather, the point is to show that, even if 
the empowered side of a policy debate is convinced that 
the weaker side is entirely wrong on the merits, they still 
owe the weaker side a justification that takes their views 
and concerns seriously. Only in this way could the weaker 
side be able to come to endorse the policy of their own 
accord rather than being coerced into sheer obedience. 
The example illustrates this idea from the perspective of 
the empowered side. But this idea could be illustrated 
equally well from the perspective of the weaker side. If 
we change the example from ‘no texting while driving’ 
to, say, ‘no eating a vegan diet’ we can easily imagine the 
empowered mother having the same impressions about 
the implausibility of her son’s vegan views and arguments 
while, at the same time, the unforced force of the better 
argument eventually comes to prevail against the mother’s 
views. Deliberation can be genuinely empowering to those 
on the weaker side of power inequalities precisely because 
of the internal connection between understanding and 
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evaluation. But deliberation can be empowering only 
if those on the stronger side fulfill their democratic 
obligation of justifying their favored policies to those who 
will be subject to them by engaging with their views, values 
and arguments and, by so doing, opening their own views 
up to the risk of being undermined by the unforced force 
of the better argument.
II. Blind deference and Anti-Democratic 
Shortcuts
In retrospect I should have more clearly explained my use 
of some key terms in the book such as ‘blind deference’ 
and ‘shortcuts.’ With respect to the latter I often point 
out that I am not against all shortcuts. It would have 
been better to add an adjective to distinguish the 
shortcuts I reject from those I endorse. After publishing 
the book, I started using the expression ‘anti-democratic 
shortcuts’ in order to highlight that I am not arguing 
against just any old shortcuts but rather only against 
those shortcuts that bypass political deliberation among 
the citizenry and thereby undermine the democratic 
ideal of self-government. Of course, this distinction 
opens up a lot of questions about the types of shortcuts 
that are democratically defensible, why and how they 
could be beneficial to a deliberative system, and so on. 
While I find these types of questions very interesting 
and important, I do not address them in the book. The 
book focuses on shortcuts that are anti-democratic to 
the extent that they expect or require citizens to blindly 
defer to the political decisions of others. So, the key 
term here is ‘blind deference.’ I offer a brief definition 
of the term in the Introduction. However, reading some 
of the contributions here made me realize that a more 
extensive discussion of the use of the term would have 
been helpful.
I use the term ‘blind deference’ to refer to a case in which 
a person deferring to some agent has no reason to expect 
the agent’s decisions to coincide with the decisions that 
she herself would have made if she had thought about 
it with access to the relevant information. For all she 
knows, the agent’s decisions could go either way. Thus, the 
‘blindness’ in question has to do with the potential lack of 
alignment between the agent’s decisions and those that 
the person deferring to the agent would endorse upon 
reflection, based on her political interests, values, and 
policy objectives. The term ‘blind’ marks the limiting case 
at one side of the spectrum when the agent has no reason 
at all to expect alignment. As soon as the person has some 
reason to expect alignment then the deference involved 
is not-blind in that sense. I will call having no reason to 
expect alignment politically blind deference. An example 
of politically blind deference would be a voter who selects 
among the representatives included on the ballot by 
tossing a coin. This voter would have no particular reason 
to expect that the representatives she happens to choose 
will make political decisions that align with her interests, 
values or policy objectives. For all she knows, the decisions 
of those representatives can go either way. I argue in the 
book that expecting or requiring citizens to defer to the 
political decisions of the majority (of the citizenry or of a 
random sample) is equally politically blind.
Certainly, the term ‘blind’ can be used to mark other 
aspects of deference. It could be used in a more general 
sense to refer to cases in which one has no reason at all 
to defer to a particular agent. Under this understanding 
of the term, as soon as one exercises some judgment to 
choose a particular agent, deference is not ‘blind.’ Yet, 
notice that this use of the term has nothing to do with 
the first one. I may exercise judgment in choosing a 
specific agent without my judgment having anything to 
do with the likelihood that the agent’s decisions coincide 
with those I myself would make upon reflection. I may 
choose an agent because I think that the agent is more 
likely to make correct (or better) decisions than I am. Since 
alignment is not at issue, the potential ‘blindness’ (or 
lack thereof) in such a case has to do with other features 
(such as the level of reflection, information and so on). 
Under this alternative understanding of the term, the 
stronger my reasons to defer to a specific agent the less 
blind my deference is, even if, for all I know, the agent’s 
decisions could go directly against what I myself would 
have decided upon reflection. I will call having no reason 
at all, alignment to the side, reflectively blind deference.
Yet another aspect of deference for which the term 
‘blind’ could also be meaningfully used is to indicate the 
level of information that the person deferring to an agent 
has about the issues to be decided upon. If the person 
knows nothing about the issues in question the person 
is deferring ‘blindly’ in that sense. However, this would 
not necessarily be a case of blind deference in my sense of 
the term. Even if I know nothing at all about some highly 
technical decisions, I still wouldn’t be blindly deferring if 
I had some reason to believe that the agent I am deferring 
to will make the same decisions I would make if I were 
properly informed. I will call knowing nothing about the 
issue informationally blind deference.
In the book I am exclusively concerned with the first 
sense—politically blind deference. But let me briefly 
summarize how the other two senses of ‘blind deference’ 
bear on the question of democratic control. Reflectively 
blind deference is sufficient for a lack of control. But its 
absence is not sufficient to establish control because it is 
compatible with politically blind deference. By contrast, 
informationally blind deference is compatible with control 
in the absence of politically blind deference. This is why 
informational shortcuts can be perfectly compatible 
with participatory deliberative democracy. Keeping these 
distinctions in mind helps to address several contributors’ 
comments on the topic of blind deference.
Politically vs Reflectively Blind Deference
As I make clear in the book, I have no objections to 
‘deference’ in the sense of delegation. I am not arguing 
for direct democracy. I only object to ‘blind’ deference. 
Now, in my usage, ‘blind’ is qualitatively different from 
‘non-blind’ and, for the purposes of my argument, there 
are no degrees of ‘blindness.’ In other words, whereas non-
blind deference may come in degrees, blind deference is 
the limiting case at one end of the spectrum that I reject. 
In their comments, Jane Mansbridge and Robert Goodin 
use the term in the opposite way. For them ‘non-blind’ 
deference (or ‘full endorsement’) is the limiting case in 
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which citizens maintain direct control over some political 
decisions whereas all cases of indirect control or lack of 
control count as ‘more or less blind.’
The reason I do not use the distinction in their way is 
because I do not aim to establish a preference for direct 
over indirect forms of democratic control, nor do I wish to 
defend the view that nothing short of ‘full endorsement’ 
of laws and policies is democratically acceptable. Rather, 
my aim is to criticize a particular type of lack of control as 
unacceptable from a democratic point of view because it 
undermines equal opportunities of securing endorsement. 
I also aim to show that the alternative approach I defend 
does not include this type of lack of control. However, for 
this argument to succeed the alternative I defend does not 
have to be able to secure direct control or full endorsement. 
Arguing against the option at one end of the spectrum is 
one thing. Endorsing the option at the opposite end of the 
spectrum is quite another. Doing the former is compatible 
with endorsing any of the available options between 
both ends of the spectrum. My critical claim is that a set 
of political institutions that requires or expects citizens 
to blindly defer to the decisions of the majority (either of 
the citizenry or of randomly selected groups) may realize 
political equality but that it lacks democratic control and 
is therefore incompatible with the democratic ideal of self-
government under any minimally plausible understanding 
of that ideal. Since my argument focuses on the limiting 
case of ‘lack of control,’ I use ‘blind’ deference to refer to 
that case and leave ‘non-blind’ deference unspecified so 
that it covers all other possible cases, i.e. indirect as well as 
direct or immediate forms of control.
There are many ways that citizens can lack control 
over the political decisions to which they are subject 
but, for the purposes of my argument, I am interested 
in the extent to which citizens have equal (effective and 
ongoing) opportunities for control over the substantive 
content of those decisions. In my usage, the distinction 
between blind and non-blind deference is similar to Mark 
Warren’s distinction between warranted and unwarranted 
trust.2 Deference is warranted or not-blind if one has 
some (defeasible) reason to assume that those to whom 
one is deferring share one’s interests, values and policy 
objectives whereas deference is blind or unwarranted if 
one has no reason to make that assumption at all. In the 
first case, one has a reason to assume that the political 
decisions endorsed by the agent to whom one is deferring 
are those that one would make if one thought through 
the issue with access to the relevant information. By 
contrast, in the second case, one has no reason to make 
this particular assumption; for all one knows, the agent’s 
decisions could go either way.
Thus, for the purposes of my argument what matters is 
not how direct or indirect the control one has is, but rather 
how it bears on the substantive content of the decisions 
that one is subject to. Mansbridge seems to assume that 
so long as citizens authorize and agent or institution to 
make political decisions and maintain the right to revoke 
that decision no blind deference is involved. I disagree. 
One can freely decide to blindly defer to the decisions 
of others but the fact that it is a free decision does not 
make it any less blind in the relevant sense.3 If I decide to 
blindly defer to the political decisions of others, whatever 
those decisions might be, I am consenting to no longer 
participate as an equal in shaping those decisions. The fact 
that I freely chose to defer to some agent has no bearing 
on whether the agent’s decisions will be aligned with 
my interests, values and policy objectives and thus on 
whether I will be able to identify with them and endorse 
them as my own. To claim that free consent is sufficient 
for democratic self-government would be like claiming 
that citizens who authorize a dictator to make all political 
decisions for them live in a democracy so long as they can 
revoke their decision at a future time.
This brings me to two interesting scenarios of deferring 
to majority rule that Goodin discusses in his comments. 
In one of the hypothetical scenarios a citizen is:
convinced of the validity of Taylor (1969) and 
Rae’s (1969) proof that, under certain conditions, 
majority rule is the decision rule that uniquely 
maximizes the frequency of your getting your way 
(i.e., having your beliefs and values being enacted 
into law). (Goodin this issue: 27).
Would deferring to the majority under these conditions 
count as a case of blind deference in my sense? I agree with 
Goodin that it would not, but I am not sure that we agree 
for the same reasons. In my view, this hypothetical case, as 
described, is indistinguishable from the standard case in 
which citizens elect representatives whose decisions they 
think are likely to coincide with what they themselves 
would have decided in the relevant context. In both cases, 
far from deferring blindly, citizens choose the agent they 
are deferring to precisely for the (defeasible) reason that 
they think it is the choice most likely to lead to political 
decisions that are aligned with their interests, values and 
policy objectives and thus the decisions that they can 
come to own and identify with.4 By contrast, in the second 
hypothetical scenario that Goodin discusses a citizen has 
read Estlund’s (2008) book and has ‘come to believe that 
majority voting is the procedure that is most likely to 
yield epistemically correct conclusions.’ (Ibid: 27) Since 
deferring to majority decisions under these conditions 
would be the result of exercising judgment, it would not 
be a case of reflectively blind deference. But would it be 
a case of politically blind deference? Of course, it would: 
correct decisions might very well not be aligned with my 
interests, values, and policy objectives at all. If that were 
so, then I would not be able to identify with them and 
endorse them as my own. Consenting to blindly defer to 
others is not an oxymoron. It may be even beneficial. But 
it isn’t participating in democratic self-government.
Goodin suggests that the second case does not involve 
(politically) blind deference because in both cases one is 
‘engaging in a project of self-government on two levels: 
you (together with others) decided the community’s 
decision rule, and you (together with others) provide 
the inputs that produce community decisions under 
that rule’ (Ibid: 27). I disagree. Whereas in the first case 
it is understood that the democratic goal of ‘having your 
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beliefs and values being enacted into law’ is the legitimate 
goal that justifies the decision rule in question, in the 
second case the decision rule is justified by the epistocratic 
goal of getting the correct decisions enacted, regardless of 
whether or not they are aligned with your own beliefs and 
values. In this case deference is (politically) blind precisely 
because you are consenting to obey decisions regardless 
of whether you can evaluate them as aligned with your 
own beliefs and values. It can hardly get any blinder than 
that! But here Goodin makes an additional suggestion. 
What if some citizens believe that ‘being correct’ is the 
preeminent virtue of social decisions? Wouldn’t citizens 
with such beliefs and values be engaged in a project of 
self-government? Wouldn’t they be able to identify with 
majoritarian decisions and endorse them as their own just 
because they are likely to be correct?
I do not think that this is possible. Making beliefs, values, 
or norms your own means that you integrate them within 
the inferential network of beliefs, values, and norms that 
you endorse. You cannot take yourself out of that process. 
Acquiring new beliefs typically requires adjustments and 
revisions to other beliefs that are inferentially connected 
to them in order to keep overall consistency in our web 
of beliefs.5 In order to do this one needs to identify which 
specific beliefs need adjustment or revision and why. 
Yet, this evaluative process is incompatible with blindly 
deferring to others. Any belief, value, or norm might be 
justified for a variety of mutually incompatible reasons 
and, depending on what those reasons are, other beliefs, 
values or norms will need to be revised. Knowing that a 
belief or decision is (likely to be) correct is not enough 
to know what follows from endorsing it and what 
other beliefs or decisions are incompatible with that 
endorsement. Instead, knowledge of the latter depends 
on the other things you happen to believe and endorse.
Think of political decisions about contested ethical 
practices (abortion, euthanasia, or gene editing) or 
those about contested economic policies (privatization 
of pensions, free trade, or universal basic income). Any 
particular decision about any of these issues could be 
justified for a variety of mutually incompatible reasons. 
Knowing that the majority favors a view (e.g. legalizing 
gene editing for human embryos), and being willing to 
adhere to their verdict because it is likely to be correct 
is not sufficient to incorporate this belief into your web 
of beliefs and make it your own. In order to do that you 
need to assess which of your other beliefs and values are 
incompatible with it (and must therefore be rejected) 
and also which beliefs and values follow from it (and 
must therefore be endorsed on pain of inconsistency). 
Is gene editing of human embryos permissible because 
gene editing is harmless in general and thus a fortiori 
harmless for embryos too? Or is it permissible because 
the potential life-saving benefits far outweigh the risks? 
If so, who will be at risk and what are the risks? Are any 
risks to individuals justified for the benefit of the greater 
number? Is gene editing of human embryos permissible 
because utilitarianism is correct? If this is so, then one 
should, on pain of inconsistency, endorse utilitarianism 
when assessing other policies as well. Is the permissibility 
of human embryo gene editing compatible with believing 
that human life begins at conception? Or must this belief 
also be rejected on pain of inconsistency? Is belief in God 
incompatible with this endorsement? These questions 
can be multiplied indefinitely. The point is simply that 
endorsing such decisions and making them your own 
means evaluating them as correct on the basis of your 
own beliefs and values so that you can update the latter 
accordingly and make needed adjustments. No one else 
can do this for you. You may blindly obey decisions but you 
cannot blindly make them your own. Blindly accepting 
the verdicts of majority decisions, whatever they might 
be, is not a way of engaging in self-governance—it is an 
abdication of it.
Politically vs Informationally Blind Deference
This raises an additional issue. Is deference blind if I lack 
information about the issues that are going to be decided 
by the agent I am deferring to? In other words, does the 
use of informational shortcuts necessarily involve some 
degree of blindness? Not according to my use of the 
term ‘blind.’ The use of informational shortcuts bears on 
how knowledgeable citizens need to be about political 
questions in order to make proper decisions about them. 
Using informational shortcuts can dramatically decrease 
the level of knowledge required among the citizenry 
and this is why such shortcuts are so incredibly useful. 
However, the (political) ‘blindness’ of deference bears 
specifically on how likely it is that the decisions made by 
the agent one is deferring to will be aligned with one’s 
own interests, values and policy objectives. These are two 
separate issues and are not necessarily correlated. In my 
opinion, deferring to majorities (of either the citizenry as 
a whole or of random samples) counts as using a blind 
shortcut because a citizen who accepts majority verdicts 
ex ante (i.e. simply because they are those of the majority), 
has no particular reason to expect them to go one way 
or another and thus, a fortiori, no reason to expect 
that these decisions will be aligned with her interests, 
values, and policy objectives. By contrast, if a citizen uses 
a shortcut because she thinks that it is likely to yield a 
political decision that is aligned with her interests, values, 
and policy objectives then there is no (political) blindness 
involved, regardless of how little the citizen herself knows 
about the political issue in question. Naturally, citizens 
may be wrong about the reliability of the shortcut. But 
being wrong is not the same as being blind.
Looking at André Bächtiger’s and Saskia Goldberg’s 
‘enhanced shortcut approach’ from this perspective, it 
is not clear to me why they qualify it as involving ‘semi-
blind’ deference. I suspect that they are using the term 
‘blind’ in the informational sense noted above, but not 
in the political sense that I am concerned with in the 
book. Following my usage, the fact that you exercise 
your own judgment and freely consent to defer to a 
particular agent does not make your deference any less 
blind if, for all you know, the agent’s decision could go 
either way. By contrast, if you defer to an agent because 
you think that the agent’s decision is likely to be aligned 
with what you would choose if you were in the relevant 
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situation then such deference does not count as blind 
even if you have no pre-existing opinion on the particular 
issue and no intention to exercise your own judgment in 
forming such an opinion. In my sense of the term, ‘semi-
blind’ deference would mean that one has some reason 
to expect the agent’s decision to be aligned with one’s 
own beliefs and values, but the reason is weak, so the 
likelihood of alignment is not very high (even if it is the 
highest among the available alternatives). Citizens often 
face this situation when electing representatives they are 
not very excited about. But I don’t think that this is what 
Bächtiger and Goldberg mean by ‘semi-blind deference.’ 
For, as far as I can see, none of the uses of minipublics 
that they discuss and endorse would lead non-participants 
to make political decisions that are unlikely to be aligned 
with their interests, values, and policy objectives or that 
could go either away. Let’s take a look at their examples.
In the first case that they discuss, the minipublic’s 
majority recommendation confirms one’s pre-existing 
opinion on the political issue in question. In such a case, 
the authors claim ‘there is nothing wrong if we “blindly” 
defer to the minipublic recommendation in case of 
preference alignment with the majority of the minipublic.’ 
(Bächtiger & Goldberg this issue 36) But if I am deciding 
according to my own opinion then I am not blindly 
deferring to the minipublic in my sense of the term. My 
decision, far from (politically) blind, is the one aligned 
with my interests, values and policy objectives. Moreover, 
‘skipping further examination’ of the minipublics’ sources 
and arguments that favor what one already believes, in the 
absence of any challenge or counterevidence, is also not a 
form of informational blindness. It is a sound epistemic 
practice.
In the second case that the authors focus on we are 
ambivalent about the issue at hand and in the third case 
the minipublic’s recommendation directly challenges our 
pre-existing opinion. In both cases, they argue, further 
engagement with additional sources and arguments 
produced by the minipublic is necessary. I agree. This 
is also their recommendation in a fourth type of case, 
namely, when the minipublic’s recommendation bears a 
very low level of consensus (52%), which signals that the 
issue is contested and thus that citizens need to pay closer 
attention to it.
I find the authors’ recommendations for all four 
types of cases completely plausible, but I fail to see how 
any of them constitute cases of ‘trust-based’ uses of 
minipublic recommendations of the kind proposed by 
MacKenzie & Warren (2012) that, in my view, do involve 
blind deference. In such cases non-participating citizens 
‘trust’ minipublics in that, instead of making up their 
own mind on the issue in question, they defer to the 
minipublics’ recommendation—for example, when they 
are called on to vote in a referendum. Because they are 
trusting the minipublic, they do not need to examine the 
information and reasons justifying the recommendation. 
Clearly, cases 2, 3, and 4 do not involve any trust-based 
uses of minipublics in that sense, since citizens are 
supposed to examine additional, independent sources 
and arguments in order to make up their own minds 
on the issue. Case 1 does not appear to involve a trust-
based use of minipublics either, since citizens are voting 
according to their own pre-existing opinion. In order to 
determine whether the authors’ approach supports trust-
based uses of minipublics (and is therefore incompatible 
with my approach) we would need to know their position 
regarding the paradigm case of such uses—a type of case 
that they do not discuss.
MacKenzie & Warren (2012) recommend such uses 
for citizens who decide to remain ‘passive’ about some 
political issues. Since citizens do not have the time or 
interest to make up their minds about every political issue 
that they might be called upon to vote for, minipublics’ 
recommendations can be useful for those citizens who 
do not have pre-existing opinions about the issues in 
question. They can trust minipublics’ recommendations 
and vote accordingly without inspecting their sources 
of information or any arguments for or against a policy. 
The assumption here seems to be that such uses do not 
involve blind but ‘warranted’ deference because all non-
participating citizens can trust that the majority of the 
minipublic shares their beliefs and values. In the book I 
argue that, since this assumption can’t be true whenever 
minipublics’ recommendations fall short of unanimous 
consensus, such trust-based uses of minipublics would 
actually require blind (or unwarranted) deference. Citizens 
simply have no more reason to assume that the majority 
of a minipublic shares their beliefs and values than they 
do to assume that the minority does.
I am not sure whether Bächtiger and Goldberg would 
accept this type of case. They recognize that there 
are some political issues about which they have ‘very 
strong opinions’ (Bächtiger & Goldberg this issue: 39) 
so they concede that ‘minipublic recommendations that 
contradict these opinions will hardly induce us to revise 
them.’ (ibid.) So let’s imagine that a recommendation 
they strongly oppose received a boost of blind support 
from ‘passive’ citizens who had no views on the issue 
and who endorsed it for the sole reason that it was 
recommended by the majority of minipublic participants. 
As a consequence, the recommendation received 80% 
instead of 65% of the votes, giving the misleading 
impression of an extraordinarily high level of support 
among the citizenry. This illicitly ‘boosted’ signal could 
have quite devastating effects for those fighting against 
that policy recommendation. Would such a trust-based 
use of minipublics strike them as fostering democratic 
self-government? I hope not. But if they do support such 
uses, their approach would actually endorse blind, not 
‘semi-blind’ deference.
III. Representation as Embodiment: Are All my 
Fellow Citizens ‘like me’?
The question at stake in trust-based uses of minipublics is 
the focus of James Pow’s, Lisa van Dijk’s and Sofie Marien’s 
very interesting empirical study. Do citizens think that 
minipublics’ participants are ‘like them’? If so, is it for 
that reason legitimate to either expect or require citizens 
to blindly defer to minipublics’ decisions? At the risk of 
stating the obvious, let me begin by pointing out that, 
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while the first question is empirical, the second question is 
normative. The legitimacy perceptions of citizens cannot 
settle the second question any more than the legitimacy 
perceptions of political scientists or political philosophers 
can. Normative questions can only be settled by the quality 
of the arguments put forward. With respect to the first, 
empirical question, I find the hypotheses at the center of 
their study very interesting. However, they raise questions 
that I am not sure can really be answered on the basis of 
the sort of empirical data that was gathered in this study. 
They might need to carry out experiments in which more 
fine-grained questions are asked of survey respondents so 
that it is possible to draw some more specific conclusions 
on the issue of trust and blind deference. Let me mention 
some of the issues.
One difficulty that I see with the study is that different 
types of similarity are used in various questions that are 
asked to respondents, but these differences do not seem 
to be properly reflected in the conclusions. Everything 
is similar to everything else in some respect or another. 
‘Similar’ is a specification-dependent term. So, it is 
always crucial to know the specific sense of ‘similarity’ 
that is at stake both when questions are asked and also 
when inferences are drawn from responses. For example, 
when evaluating the important question of respondents’ 
‘decision acceptance’ of minipublics’ recommendations 
we are told ‘respondents were significantly more likely to 
accept the overall outcome of the citizens’ assembly when 
they perceived the participants to be like them even when 
controlling for outcome favourability’ (Pow, van Dijk & 
Marien this issue: 50). However, we are not told in which 
respects participants needed to be ‘like them.’
The overall suggestion in the paper is that the key 
similarity trait is that participants are ‘ordinary’ citizens. 
It is indeed very plausible that citizens trust their fellow 
citizens in some generic and vague sense. But this generic 
trust is not sufficiently specific to draw conclusions about 
citizens’ willingness to blindly defer to minipublics. In 
fact, the data of the study seem to confirm this. When 
the authors ask survey respondents whether minipublic 
participants are ‘like them,’ we are told that the relevant 
contrast is ‘politicians.’ Thus, it is the feature of participants 
being ‘ordinary’ citizens that matters. However, once 
the authors introduce a further specification, namely, 
the political issue at stake, they expect respondents to 
distinguish between participants ‘who are like them on 
the particular trait that is relevant to the minipublic’s 
task’ (Ibid 46) and those who are not. In other words, 
as soon as more specific, politically relevant questions 
are asked, respondents readily judge some participants 
within minipublics as not being ‘like them’ even though 
they are ordinary citizens. Moreover, the authors expect 
this distinction to impact the legitimacy perceptions 
of respondents. Indeed, the study’s findings support 
this hypothesis (H2). For respondents, the inclusion of 
participants who are ‘like them’ in the generic sense of 
being ordinary citizens is insufficient for the legitimacy 
of minipublics. Respondents insist upon the inclusion of 
enough citizens who are like them on the particular trait 
that is relevant to what is politically at stake (Ibid 51).
This difference is directly relevant to the issue of blind 
deference in my sense of the term. Indeed, it seems that 
citizens are not willing to blindly defer to ordinary citizens 
as such. To the contrary, they are willing to defer to those 
‘citizen-representatives’ who share the trait most relevant 
to what is politically at stake. If this is so, then generic ‘like 
me’ judgments are not a sufficient indicator of legitimacy 
perceptions. Substantive political representation matters 
more. This observation also seems to challenge the 
authors’ conjecture that the relevant bond between 
citizens and minipublics participants ‘is affective, not 
substantive’ (Ibid 45) Yet, things get even muddier. For, it 
turns out that respondents also reject the idea of including 
in minipublics only members who are ‘like them’: ‘non-
participants still find it important that ordinary citizens 
who are not directly like them in terms of specific traits 
are also present in the minipublic. This is even true if 
these other ordinary citizens belong to the ‘“opposing 
camp” on the issue at stake’ (Ibid 50). In sum, it seems that 
respondents genuinely albeit tacitly appreciate that, to 
the extent that minipublics mirror the citizenry, it simply 
cannot be the case that all participants are ‘like them.’ 
Some will share their beliefs and values and others won’t. 
This, in turn, is relevant for whom they see as legitimately 
representing them among all participants; not just any 
‘ordinary’ citizen will do.
Taking all of this into account, let’s examine hypothesis 
H1a: ‘the more non-participants perceive minipublic 
participants to be “like them,” the more legitimate they 
perceive minipublics to be.’ (Ibid 45) If we take this 
hypothesis as a comparative statement then we face the 
problem that we do not know the specific respects in which 
citizens need to be more similar to one another.6 If we 
interpret the relevant similarity in terms of specific traits, 
it is simply not true that the more participants are ‘like 
them’ the more legitimate minipublics are seen to be. The 
opposite seems to be true, since including participants 
who are their exact opposite (‘in the opposing camp’) 
also seems important to respondents. Thus, as stated, 
the hypothesis seems disconfirmed. But if one interprets 
the relevant similarity as being ‘ordinary’ citizens then 
the hypothesis is also disconfirmed. For it is also not true 
that, so long as all participants are ordinary citizens, the 
minipublic would be seen as ‘legitimate’. Again, according 
to the respondents, including citizens who are ‘like them 
on the relevant trait for the issue at stake’ is also necessary 
for legitimacy. This strongly suggests that one needs 
more fine-grained hypotheses in order to draw specific 
conclusions on the issues of trust, blind deference, 
etc. Nevertheless, I would like to give some tentative 
impressions about the data.
Like many minipublic enthusiasts, the authors seem 
to embrace the populist notion of representation as 
‘embodiment.’ According to that notion, minipublic 
participants ‘speak like the people, rather than for them’ 
(Ibid 45). I find this notion of representation highly 
problematic.7 The relationship of embodiment can only 
work under the assumption of a homogenous ‘people’ 
whose members share the same interests, values, and 
policy objectives. They can trust each other because 
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everyone is politically like everyone else. Note that the 
assumption of homogeneity is essential. For, if ‘the people’ 
were politically divided (if they had conflicting beliefs 
and values) then it would be impossible for everyone to 
speak like everyone else. By being like some citizens, one 
would necessarily be unlike others. As we are currently 
witnessing, the main problem with using this populist 
notion of representation is that, in the face of legitimate 
political disagreements, the tacit default assumption of 
homogeneity can only be maintained by identifying the 
majority as the ‘real people’ and excluding dissenting 
minorities (e.g. as ‘enemies of the people’ who do not 
speak like them). Looking at the study’s data from this 
perspective, I find the respondents’ nuanced judgments 
on similarity, political representation, inclusion, and 
legitimacy reassuring. They do not seem to share the 
populist notion of representation as embodiment nor 
do they seem to share the populist hostility towards 
politicians that would certainly have provided strong 
confirmation of hypothesis H1b.
IV. Empowered Minipublics as Second-Best 
Strategy
But what are the consequences of rejecting the 
assumption of homogeneity and recognizing that citizens 
living under free institutions have different interests, 
values, and policy objectives which give rise to legitimate 
political disagreements? From a democratic point of view, 
the most important consequence is that citizens can only 
legitimately further their interests, values, and policy 
objectives if they resolve their disagreements with their 
fellow citizens who have equal rights to be co-legislators. 
They need to change each other’s hearts and minds. 
Such mutual learning processes require actual political 
struggle. They cannot be wished away, bypassed, or 
delegated to the few in the hope that they will do the 
thinking and deciding for us and that we can then simply 
follow them without learning. This won’t be democratic, 
and it won’t work.
Keeping this insight in mind, my claim about the 
desirability of empowering minipublics must be 
understood as a conditional claim. If one agrees that blind 
deference is inimical to democracy (my main claim), then 
the issue of whether one should endorse giving decisional 
power to minipublics should depend on whether this will 
require citizens to blindly defer to their decisions. I agree 
with Mansbridge that, at this historical juncture, we do 
not know much about the consequences, modalities 
and possibilities of using deliberative minipublics. But, 
precisely for that reason, when evaluating their democratic 
potential, it is very important to carefully examine whether 
their institutionalization would enable citizens to identify 
with the laws and policies to which they are subject and 
endorse them as their own or whether it would have the 
opposite effect over time. From a democratic perspective it 
makes all the difference in the world whether minipublics 
are thought of as ways to empower the citizenry or as 
ways to bypass the citizenry in the hope that minipublics’ 
participants will do the thinking and deciding for us.
In his contribution, Jim Fishkin challenges this 
argument. He does not seem to believe that minipublics 
could serve the participatory goal of empowering the 
citizenry. If I understand him correctly, he thinks that such 
a participatory goal could be served by institutionalizing 
something along the lines of Deliberation Day, but not 
minipublics. Apparently, we basically have two options 
with respect to the latter. Minipublics can either be 
empowered to directly make political decisions bypassing 
the citizenry or they can serve as a source of information 
for the citizenry—in which case they are reduced to ‘mere 
talk’ with no political impact. This view leads Fishkin to 
paint the following picture. A participatory deliberative 
democracy is the first-best strategy towards achieving a 
deliberative society. But this strategy has no need of or use 
for minipublics. Minipublics are needed whenever mass 
participation in quality deliberation is not a realistic option. 
Under non-ideal conditions, minipublics are a second-
best strategy. This is so because minipublics can make a 
high-quality impact on decision-making only if they are 
directly connected to the political system while bypassing 
the actual low-quality processes of public opinion and will 
formation in which the citizenry participates.
My problem with this line of argument, contrary to 
what Fishkin suggests, is not that I am not willing to settle 
for less than a ‘first-best’ strategy. I am perfectly happy to 
embrace any second-best strategy that would get us closer 
to the same goals as the first-best strategy. But we can’t use 
a non-participatory strategy to reach participatory goals. 
We can’t get closer to democratic self-government by 
empowering the few to make decisions and then expect 
the many to blindly follow them. This strategy would get 
us farther away from the goal.
To my own surprise, I have the impression that I am more 
optimistic than Fishkin about the democratic potential 
of minipublics. I do not see why institutionalizing 
minipublics could not be part and parcel of a first-best 
strategy for reaching participatory goals. First of all, the 
fact that minipublics are not themselves institutions 
of mass participation is not an argument against their 
potential to serve participatory goals like improving 
the quality of deliberation by the citizenry. Newspapers 
contribute to the quality of public deliberation without 
having to be structured like Wikipedia. As I argue in the 
book, even the institutions of judicial review, institutions 
which are paradigmatically not amenable to mass 
participation, can decisively serve participatory goals by 
enhancing the communicative power of minorities and 
in so doing improving the overall quality of deliberation 
in the public sphere. From a participatory perspective it 
is not simply the participation of those who actually file 
lawsuits that matters but rather their effects on the public 
debate about contested issues (more on this later). Besides 
this, I also do not see why minipublics can have an impact 
on the political system only if they are empowered to 
make decisions that bypass the citizenry.
It is true that minipublics cannot generate power on 
their own. But they can certainly enhance or challenge 
existing political powers. If this is true, then why not 
enhance the political power of the citizenry while also 
improving the quality of the processes of opinion and 
will formation in which citizens participate? In all the 
examples that I discuss in the book, I rely on already 
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existing and organized political actors whose power could 
be enhanced by minipublics if their institutionalization 
were generalized in democratic societies. For example, in 
the case of contestatory uses of minipublics, I rely on the 
existence of social movements and political organizations 
who have already embarked upon political struggles to 
change the hearts and minds of their fellow citizens with 
respect to some contested issue. They make strategic use 
of a variety of existing institutions to further their political 
goals (from writing op-eds in media outlets to filing 
lawsuits, organizing strikes, lobbying politicians, and 
so on). If minipublics were institutionalized, then these 
institutions could also be added to their toolkit. It is the 
political activism of already mobilized civil society groups 
that would prevent minipublics’ recommendations 
from falling on deaf ears or being reduced to ‘mere talk.’ 
Similarly, vigilant uses of minipublics rely on entry points 
to the political system that already exist such as ballot 
initiatives, referenda, etc. Minipublics’ recommendations 
could decisively enhance the deliberative quality of citizens’ 
own political decisions especially if they offered citizens 
key information for understanding what is at stake and 
evaluating the most important reasons for and against a 
certain policy. The same insight applies to the anticipatory 
uses of minipublics that I discuss in the book. In fact, these 
uses speak against the view that minipublics can only be 
remedial or second-best options. Fishkin claims that in 
a democracy wherein nearly everyone deliberates there 
would be no need for minipublics such as Deliberative 
Polls. I do not see why that would be so. Regardless of how 
good the quality of deliberation among the citizenry in a 
democratic society might become, the sheer amount and 
complexity of political decisions ensures that it will always 
be necessary to divide political labor. As long as this is 
the case citizens will need trustworthy informational 
shortcuts in order to make up their own minds on the 
merits of a variety of political issues, especially issues that 
are new or uncertain. Minipublics could certainly fulfill 
that function by making the most relevant information 
and the most important reasons for and against their 
proposals available to the citizenry. They could provide 
democratic shortcuts to empower citizens in their fight 
against the many existing anti-democratic shortcuts that 
enable powerful actors to directly influence the political 
system while making it less and less responsive to citizens’ 
interests, values, and policy objectives.
Ronald van Crombrugge’s defense of ‘citizen-initiated 
citizens’ assemblies’ offers an excellent example of what 
a participatory use of minipublics could look like if that 
use were crafted to empower the citizenry. As he explains, 
citizen-initiated minipublics would enhance the agenda-
setting capacity for the citizenry while also combining 
it with the deliberative qualities of minipublics (i.e. 
safeguarding the quality of information and preventing 
deliberative exclusions). Since the recommendations of 
minipublics would be coupled with formal law-making 
procedures this would ensure that they wouldn’t be ‘mere 
talk.’ However, since the citizenry would determine the 
proposals that minipublics would evaluate, this use of 
minipublics would empower citizens to make the political 
system more responsive to their interests, values, and 
policy objectives over time. Granted, in order to serve this 
function minipublics would have to have some decisional 
power. After all, those proposals that do not survive 
the scrutiny of a minipublic’s majority would not be 
recommended to parliament for consideration. This gives 
me the opportunity to address a question that Fishkin 
poses that highlights a need for some clarification.
If an institution serves a function it will necessarily 
exercise some decisional power. I do not oppose any 
and all forms of decisional power for minipublics. What 
I oppose is a form of decisional power that bypasses the 
citizenry while connecting up directly to the political 
system. However, if the institution in question is 
designed to serve participatory goals then the fact that 
it exercises some decisional power is not a problem per 
se. This is particularly clear in the case of the institutions 
of judicial review. The fact that Supreme Courts have 
strong decisional power does not rule out that they serve 
important participatory goals. As I argue in the book, these 
participatory goals justify their democratic legitimacy. In 
my view, before determining whether or not an institution 
serves democratic goals, one has to pay attention to the 
functions that it serves within the entire system.
Citizen-initiated minipublics are but one example 
and I agree with Van Crombrugge that one should not 
underestimate the many difficulties and hurdles involved 
in institutionalizing minipublics. However, the example 
of citizen-initiated minipublics deftly highlights the 
fundamental difference between designing minipublics 
with an eye towards fulfilling participatory aims versus 
designing them with an eye towards bypassing the 
citizenry. My book aims to inspire all those who are involved 
with the institutionalization of minipublics to direct their 
efforts towards participatory proposals. Granted, this 
process is likely to be hard. As Van Crombrugge vividly 
illustrates, the fact that the Flemish Citizen’s Assembly Bill 
proposal was voted down by the Flemish Parliament, even 
under quite ideal conditions, clearly indicates that such 
a project will be an uphill struggle. Besides ‘the chicken 
and egg problem’ that he identifies, the biggest hurdle 
is indeed the predictable unwillingness of politicians to 
share power with others. However, these difficulties are 
likely to be the same whether the aim is empowering the 
citizenry or the random few. If pitched political struggle is 
equally necessary along each path, then we may as well try 
the former and get more democracy as a result.
V. Ordinary politics vs Constitutional 
Challenges: Can Citizens take off their Robes?
In the discussion of blind deference above, I passed 
over one important issue raised by Goodin. Doesn’t my 
institutional approach also require blind deference? After 
all I recognize that, especially within pluralist societies, 
not every citizen can endorse every single decision they 
are subject to. Therefore, the approach I defend seems 
to suppose that citizens will be able to endorse those 
institutions that enable them to express dissent and 
contest decisions while also blindly accepting substantive 
decisions that they cannot endorse as their own. If this 
characterization is correct, then how is this any different 
from simply endorsing majoritarian institutions despite 
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the fact that one cannot endorse all their substantive 
decisions? I think that there is a subtle yet important 
difference here.
Deep pluralist approaches defend the legitimacy of 
majoritarian institutions and reject non-majoritarian 
institutions (such as judicial review) as democratically 
illegitimate. On this approach citizens are expected to 
blindly (and voluntarily) defer to majoritarian decisions 
that they disagree with because this is the legitimate thing 
to do. To be more precise, this approach expects citizens 
to (voluntarily) accept majoritarian decisions—whatever 
they might be (i.e. blindly)—as perfectly legitimate for 
the sole reason that they are endorsed by the majority. By 
contrast, the institutional approach I defend never expects 
citizens to (blindly and voluntarily) accept the legitimacy 
of all majoritarian decisions simply because the majority 
endorses them.
According to my normative reconstruction, the 
institutions of constitutional democracies operate under 
the assumption that political decisions that touch upon 
citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms cannot be 
legitimately settled by majority rule. To put this the other 
way around: these decisions are not legitimate simply 
because they are endorsed by the majority. They can be 
contested and must be settled on substantive grounds. On 
my approach this is the specific sense in which institutions 
never require or expect citizens to blindly defer to 
majoritarian verdicts on these issues (i.e. to accept them 
as legitimate simply because the majority endorses them). 
Goodin suggests that this is little consolation for those 
engaging in legal contestation if the courts end up ruling 
against them. I actually disagree. As I argue in the book, 
the review process cannot guarantee that every citizen’s 
views will prevail. Indeed, given that citizens disagree, 
no process could deliver that result. However, the losing 
side gets something very valuable from the fact that this 
process—in contrast to other possible processes (e.g. 
decisions by secret ballot)—is rooted in a public debate 
about substantive reasons: they receive specific and 
reasoned evidence for the legal decisions in question that 
they can then use to more effectively challenge them in 
the future. This gives citizens a unilateral power to reopen 
the public debate and to try to win the hearts and minds of 
their fellow citizens on the basis of reasons, not numbers.
This insight raises another important issue that is at 
the center of Simone Chambers’ contribution. Is my 
democratic re-reading of judicial review supposed also to 
provide a constitutionally focused alternative conception 
of deliberative democracy? It very much depends on 
what one mean by this. If this is supposed to mean that 
judicial review furnishes the paradigmatic institutional 
opportunity for the exercise of a participatory conception 
of deliberative democracy then my answer is a resounding 
‘No’. This is not how I understand the democratic 
significance of judicial review. But the fact that several 
commentators got this impression makes me fear that 
the structure of the book (culminating as it does with 
a discussion of judicial review) may, against my own 
intentions, be misleading and that I should have been 
clearer on this point so as to prevent misunderstandings. 
Let me briefly explain my views here.
What I call a participatory conception of deliberative 
democracy is an alternative to an epistemic conception 
of deliberative democracy. The latter sees the importance 
of political deliberation in the epistemic benefits of 
identifying ‘better’ policies ‘faster,’ which will then 
lead to better political outcomes. On the basis of 
this understanding of deliberation the functions 
and significance of the various political institutions, 
the public sphere, and the deliberative system as a 
whole are interpreted from an exclusively epistemic 
perspective.8 By contrast, a participatory conception of 
deliberative democracy understands the importance 
of political deliberation in terms of enabling citizens to 
participate in a project of self-government. On the basis 
of this understanding of deliberation I offer an alternative 
interpretation of the significance of the very same 
political institutions and democratic sites that are the 
focus of other democratic conceptions. When one adopts 
a citizen-centered perspective of analysis these familiar 
institutions acquire a different significance because 
the questions we are trying to answer are different. Can 
citizens endorse the political institutions that they are 
subject to upon reflection? Once they understand their 
function and significance, can citizens take ownership 
over these institutions? Can they see themselves as equal 
participants in a political project of self-government?
The point and rationale behind articulating a 
participatory perspective is not to identify a paradigmatic 
institutional opportunity of participation that would 
be different from or better than those identified by 
epistemic conceptions of deliberative democracy (e.g. 
epistocracy or lottocracy). Not at all. The aim is to offer 
a different understanding of the existing institutional 
opportunities of participation in democratic societies 
as well as of those that may be created in the future. In 
that spirit, the book offers an alternative interpretation of 
democratic innovations such as minipublics. It also offers 
a democratic interpretation of the institutions of judicial 
review. However, this interpretation does not try to 
elevate legal contestation to the quintessential exercise 
of self-government. Nor, for that matter, does it try to 
elevate participatory uses of minipublics to such a special 
status. This is the case not so much because I think that 
some other exercise of political rights (e.g. voting) is more 
quintessential. Rather, it is because none of them can 
have genuine democratic significance in the absence of 
all the others. In the absence of a mobilized civil society 
and a receptive public sphere legal contestation would 
hardly have any democratic effects at all. Conversely, 
voting in the absence of effective opportunities for legal 
contestation would hardly count as an exercise in self-
government for persistent minorities. These are just two 
examples. However, the idea of mutual reinforcement 
holds for all opportunities, venues, and sites of citizen 
participation. My overall aim (and hope) is that a 
participatory interpretation of deliberative democracy 
can offer some guidance to citizens’ political struggles 
towards institutional reform and democratization. At the 
very least, this conception can help citizens identify those 
proposals that would eliminate existing antidemocratic 
shortcuts that prevent the political system to be properly 
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responsive to their interests and values and those 
proposals that would add antidemocratic shortcuts and 
could therefore make things worse, even with the best 
democratic intentions.
This brief explanation helps answer another important 
concern that Chambers raises, namely, whether a 
citizen-centered participatory perspective is unduly 
individualistic. Does adopting this perspective involve 
‘imagining each individual potentially engaging in mutual 
justification?’ Is this perspective compatible with the 
Habermasian feedback loop model of public deliberation 
that I endorse in the book or does this model require 
adopting a system view, instead of a practice-view? As for 
the first question, adopting a participatory conception 
requires justifying the constitutive norms, function, and 
significance of democratic institutions from the internal 
perspective of citizens who are expected or required 
to make use of them. Only from within a practice view 
is it possible to show that citizens can endorse these 
institutions upon reflection. In that sense, yes, a plausible 
conception of democracy must be able to show that 
political institutions enable citizens to respect the priority 
of public reasons when defending the policies that they 
favor such that all citizens can see themselves as equal 
participants in a project of self-government. However, 
as I repeatedly insist throughout the book, this does not 
mean that deliberation should be thought of in terms of a 
face-to-face model—as if it were the sum of all synchronic 
conversations between individuals on political issues that 
take place at a particular time. This touches upon the 
second question.
In line with Habermas’s feedback loop model, I 
understand deliberation as a diachronic process that takes 
places in many different ways at multiple sites and with 
constant variation among participants over time. One 
crucial aspect of this model is that it views communication 
as a circular process in which some topics can become the 
object of debate among interlocutors only against the 
shared background of tacit presuppositions (i.e. beliefs, 
values, norms, attitudes, etc.) upon which all participants 
draw. That ‘lifeworld’ reservoir of shared presuppositions, 
in turn, is being constantly transformed as a result of the 
outcomes of all the different communication processes. 
Insofar as members of a political community share this 
lifeworld they are passively ‘participating’ in the ongoing 
transformation of beliefs, values, and mentalities that is 
produced by the contributions of a variety of actors and 
that generates shared convictions. These communication 
processes range from institutionalized political discourses 
to more diffused discourses in the media, in everyday 
communication in civil society, in subaltern publics, and 
so on. The deliberative system perspective can be fruitful 
for understanding the interconnections between all the 
different sites and varieties of political deliberation that 
are simultaneously taking place in society. However, I think 
that it would be a mistake to equate adopting a holistic 
perspective towards the deliberative system with adopting 
a merely functionalist analysis that is undertaken from the 
third-personal perspective of a ‘detached observer.’ Like all 
other political institutions, the deliberative system must 
also be evaluated from the normative, internal perspective 
of participants in order to see whether it contributes to the 
democratic legitimacy of political decisions or, if it does 
not, how it should be properly transformed or improved.
Another important question that Chambers raises is 
whether my approach limits ‘deliberation’ to debates about 
constitutional questions and, as a consequence, relegates 
ordinary politics to processes of compromise, bargaining 
or majoritarian decisions that are outside deliberation 
proper. If this were the case, then deliberative democracy 
would have little to say about the type of ordinary politics 
that constitutes the bulk of citizens’ political activity. If I 
understand her argument correctly, she suspects that this 
may be the case because (1) I endorse a public reason view 
of deliberation and, since (2) public reason constraints 
apply only to debates about rights, then it must follow 
that (3) ‘deliberation is appropriate to answer questions 
about rights [but] not everyday wrangling over policy. 
(Chambers this issue: 79) I don’t endorse this view. I agree 
with the first assumption but disagree with the second. 
This is why the conclusion does not follow.
In my view, political deliberation is typically and for 
the most part about justifying collective goals, setting 
proper priorities among them, and determining the 
most efficient means to reach them under conditions 
of scarcity. Political deliberation can also concern how 
best to protect and promote desirable social practices 
and institutions, as well as a variety of other goals. I also 
believe that political deliberation should be governed 
by public reason constraints. However, I reject the 
exclusion model of public reason and instead propose a 
prioritization model. On this basis, my argument in the 
book goes against standard Rawlsian views, in that public 
deliberation about laws and policies, in my view, cannot 
and need not be neutral towards conceptions of the good. 
To the contrary, it seems quite clear that a crucial element 
of advocating for the adoption of a specific policy is that 
one offers arguments and reasons that purport to show 
why the practices the policy regulates are good, beneficial, 
worth protecting, or whatever the case may be. Citizens 
do not necessarily have ‘to put on their robes,’ so to speak, 
in order to deliberate about these important political 
questions. However, this does not mean that when they 
‘take off their robes’ they are not deliberating or that their 
deliberation should not be governed by the constraints of 
public reason, as Chambers seems to assume.
So long as there is no particular reason to assume 
that a policy under discussion is incompatible with the 
protection of some fundamental rights and freedoms, 
public deliberation will typically be about whether or not 
the policy’s enactment would be beneficial, desirable, 
advantageous or whatever the case might be. Citizens 
participating in these sorts of debates will be offering 
reasons for and against a policy that draw upon their 
own interests, values and goals as articulated by whatever 
(religious or secular) comprehensive doctrines they 
happen to hold. However, as soon as some citizens don 
their robes and object that the policy in question violates 
a fundamental right or freedom, then their fellow citizens 
will have to follow suit and prioritize the settlement of 
that question before they can resume their deliberation 
on any of the other issues related to that policy. Does this 
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mean that before the citizens ‘put on their robes’ their 
deliberations are not governed by public reason constraints 
or that they do not need to respect the priority of public 
reasons? Not at all. A situation like the one described, in 
which no one had any particular reason to suspect that the 
policy in question may violate some fundamental rights 
or freedoms, is a situation in which everyone involved 
believed that enacting that policy would respect the 
priority of public reasons. This is why their deliberation 
was focused on everything else that matters for deciding 
whether or not to enact the policy in question. The priority 
of public reasons may be inconspicuous when citizens have 
not yet donned their robes. But that does not mean that 
it is not respected. To the contrary, any suspicion that that 
priority has been violated would require citizens to put 
on their robes, no matter how ‘ordinary’ the policy under 
deliberation may be.
VI. Is My Democratic Conception State-Centric? 
The All Subjected vs All Affected Principle
Mark Warren and Tetsuki Tamura are correct that my book 
adopts a state-centric view, at least in the sense that it does 
not address subnational and transnational institutions or 
issues of global democracy. Ironically, the main reason that 
I had given up on writing a book about democracy years 
ago is that normative democratic theory is remarkably 
state-centric and thus, in the wake of globalization, misses 
a lot of where the action is. However, the current crisis of 
democracy has shaken my (complacent) assumption that 
we can take democracy for granted at the state level (at 
least in the richest countries of the world) and worry only 
about how to extend democracy everywhere else. The fear 
of democratic backsliding and the erosion of democratic 
institutions at the state level is what motivated me to 
write this book, even though doing so meant that I had to 
ignore my own criticisms (levied over the past decade) of 
state-centric approaches in my work on global governance 
institutions and international human rights. Having said 
this, I hasten to add that my apparently ‘state-centric’ focus 
is a contingent not an essential feature of the participatory 
conception of deliberative democracy that I defend. I 
completely agree with Tamura’s claim that this conception 
is compatible with ‘a pluralized understanding of both 
self-government and sites of democracy’ and (Tamura 
this issue: 93) and should be further developed in that 
pluralistic direction.
However, I disagree with Warren’s suggestion that 
overcoming a state-centric view of democracy requires 
replacing the ‘all-subjected’ principle with the ‘all-
affected’ principle. In my view, these principles fulfill 
different functions and are therefore best understood 
as complementary rather than in competition. This is a 
complex topic and I do not have the space to discuss it 
in depth here, but let me just briefly mention my take on 
the complementarity of these two principles. In my view, 
justice requires us to rightfully regulate our interactions 
among all those whom we cannot avoid affecting (the 
all-affected principle) and democracy requires that all 
those subject to these regulations can see themselves as 
their authors (the all subjected principle).9 Among other 
things, the first principle requires us to rightfully regulate 
externalities and the second requires us to give a say to all 
those subject to the regulations in question.
In my opinion, we can avoid counterintuitive 
interpretations of these principles only if we keep their 
distinctive functions separate. For example, keeping the 
principles separate can help to prevent interpretations 
that would take the ‘all affected principle’ as a principle 
of demarcation, i.e. as a principle of exclusion rather than 
inclusion. Under such an interpretation of the principle, 
only those directly affected by the relevant interactions 
ought to have a say on their proper regulation. The 
counterintuitive consequences that this would yield 
are particularly salient in the context of regulations 
that infringe upon fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Regulations that violate human rights ought to be 
everyone’s concern, whether or not everyone is likely to 
be directly affected by them. Everyone ought to have a 
say on the proper legal protection of everyone’s human 
rights. But this is not because or to the extent that we may 
be directly affected by the regulations in question. To the 
contrary, if we all have a duty of justice to reach a rightful 
condition with all those with whom we cannot avoid 
interacting (i.e. those we affect with our actions) then 
we cannot ‘outsource’ that duty just to the parties who 
are most directly affected by some of these interactions, 
regardless of what is at stake and regardless of existing 
power inequalities among them. To do so would likely 
leave the most vulnerable unprotected. Foreigners who 
live outside a country’s jurisdiction may not be directly 
affected by its regulations permitting the imprisonment of 
homosexuals or stoning adulterous women to death, but 
they ought to have a say in undermining such regulations. 
On the other hand, keeping the complementarity 
between both principles also helps avoid an unduly 
narrow interpretation of the ‘all subjected’ principle. 
Endorsing this principle within democratic theory (i.e. as 
a principle of inclusion in decision-making), is not per se 
problematic in the sense that worries Warren, so long as 
our democratic theory is complemented with a theory of 
justice that justifies the duty to rightfully regulate all our 
interactions with those we cannot avoid affecting. This is 
the task of a cosmopolitan project of global justice that, in 
my opinion, requires us to defend a global participatory 
democracy. But, as I mention at the end of the book, that 
is a task for another book.
Notes
 1 For an overview of the debate see Habermas 2003: 
237–276; and Lafont, 1999: 315–360; Lafont 2003, 
2004, 2012.
 2 I am being cautious here for the following reason. 
On the one hand, Warren explains ‘warranted trust’ 
as follows: ‘When individuals trust, they suspend 
judgment. But in a warranted trust relationship, 
judgments are suspended, not because individuals 
are “blind,” but because [they] have made a prior 
judgment that their interests or values align with 
those of the trusted agent.’ (Warren this issue: 86) 
So understood, the distinction between warranted and 
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unwarranted trust corresponds quite precisely to the 
distinction between politically blind and non-blind 
deference, and this captures the specific sense of blind 
deference focused on in my book. On the other hand, in 
his contribution Warren seems to wrongly assume that 
I use the term in the broader sense of ‘reflectively blind’ 
deference, when he claims: ‘By “blind,” Lafont means 
that deference lacks any reasons or empowerments 
with respect to those making decisions and enforcing 
laws and policies.’ (Ibid 83). This makes me wonder 
whether Warren himself ever uses the term ‘warranted 
trust’ in the broader sense of having any reason at all 
to trust, even if the reason in question has nothing to 
do with the expectation of alignment of interests and 
values in particular. If he does, then his use of the 
warranted/unwarranted trust distinction would not 
coincide with my use of the blind/non-blind deference 
distinction and, consequently, our substantive views 
about the kind of deference/trust that is democratically 
acceptable could also differ.
 3 I agree with Mark Warren that deference is generally 
understood to be voluntary. When I use formulations 
in the book such as that citizens may be ‘forced to 
blindly defer’ to the decisions of others, I am adopting 
the perspective of citizens who are evaluating ex 
ante whether specific institutions are democratically 
legitimate and deserve their endorsement. It is from 
this perspective that I claim that institutions with 
antidemocratic shortcuts would leave citizens no 
alternative but to blindly defer to the decisions of others 
and, for that reason, democratic citizens should not 
endorse them upon reflection.
 4 I am accepting the features of the hypothetical case as it 
is described. But, to avoid giving the wrong impression, 
let me mention that I find the purely ‘quantitative’ 
nature of the argument highly problematic. Citizens 
are likely to care less about how frequently they will get 
their way and much more about what will be at stake 
when they lose. If protecting their fundamental rights 
and freedoms takes priority then they won’t accept 
purely majoritarian institutions. I am assuming, for 
the sake of the argument, that our hypothetical citizen 
does not care about this distinction.
 5 The required revisions and adjustments will be more 
or less wide-ranging depending on how deeply 
embedded or peripherical the beliefs in question are 
within our overall inferential web of beliefs.
 6 We also face the problem that we do not know 
the specific functions, powers or authorities about 
which legitimacy questions are asked. As stated, the 
hypothesis fails to specify the functions for which 
minipublics are supposed to be ‘legitimate’—for 
example, for advisory purposes (as it was asked in 
the survey) or in order to make binding decisions? 
Respondents’ legitimacy judgments are likely to 
vary depending on the particular functions that are 
ascribed to minipublics.
 7 I offer a detailed analysis and critique in Lafont, 
forthcoming.
 8 By contrast, the participatory conception of 
deliberative democracy that I defend in the book 
endorses a pluralist conception of legitimacy, as 
Mansbridge rightly shows. I do not discuss this issue 
explicitly in the book, but I offer a brief analysis of the 
advantages of a pluralist conception of legitimacy over 
the monistic conceptions defended by epistocrats and 
deep pluralists in my review of Nadia Urbinati’s book 
Democracy Disfigured (Lafont 2015).
 9 Here I am (loosely) following Kant’s rendering of the 
obligation to enter into a ‘rightful condition (see Kant 
1996: 305–314).
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